








Smooth coping: an embodied,




Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not
use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory.
Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while
Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article
argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. According to
Heidegger, the basis of human agents’ encounters with the world is in a prereflective, pragmatically engaged disposition
marked by readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), sometimes equated with ‘‘smooth coping.’’ Examples of smooth coping
include walking, throwing a ball, and other embodied actions that do not require reflective thought. I argue that smooth
coping primarily consists of Type 1 processes. The Heideggerian dual-process model yields distinctly different hypotheses
from Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping, and I will critically engage with Dreyfus’ work.
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1. Introduction
Since their introduction in the 1970s, dual-process the-
ories have been developed in several fields, including
cognitive psychology (Sloman, 1996; Wason & Evans,
1974), social psychology (Chaiken, 1980; Devine,
1989), behavioral economics (Kahneman, 2011;
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), and the philosophy of
mind (Carruthers, 2006; Dennett, 1991; Frankish,
2004). Their basic premise is that human reasoning is
split into two discrete classes of processes: Type 1 or
intuitive processes are autonomous and don’t require
working memory, while Type 2 or reflective processes
are decoupled from the immediate situation and require
working memory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Some
researchers in embodied cognition have begun to look
to dual-process theory to argue that embodied action is
Type 1 or it constitutes a novel type altogether (S. E.
Dreyfus, 2014; Furley et al., 2015; Körner & Strack,
2018; Petracca, 2020).
This article argues for an embodied dual-process the-
ory based on the work of the phenomenologist Martin
Heidegger and recent embodied cognitive science. I
argue that the collection of Type 1 processes exceeds
the bounds of the brain and is embodied through the
parallel networks of the peripheral nervous system and
musculature. Although several embodied dual-process
theories focus on how the body influences dual-process
cognition (Körner & Strack, 2018; Petracca, 2020), this
article instead focuses on ways that the physiological
body is constitutively part of many Type 1 processes.
More specifically, smooth coping primarily consists of
Type 1 processes. Smooth coping is a catch-all term for
embodied action such as walking, running, grasping, or
skiing, and is distinguished from more intentionally
controlled action, as you might find in a novice learning
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to drive. Phenomenologists consider smooth coping to
be a basic, background mode of human activity
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012). My claim is that smooth
coping is predominantly a Type 1 phenomenon. My
argument has two central components:
1. Embodied action or smooth coping involves the
defining features of Type 1 processes (autonomy
and no working memory requirement) and many of
its typical correlates (see Table 1).
2. Smooth coping is, therefore, primarily a Type 1 pro-
cess (although Type 2 processes can also play a role,
such as in expert action).
I begin by introducing dual-process theory (Section
2). I then introduce Martin Heidegger’s phenomenol-
ogy of embodied action or smooth coping (Section 3).
Finally, I develop the outlines of my embodied dual-
process account (sections 3.1–3.5), several elements of
which are based on Heidegger’s phenomenology. My
embodied dual-process model will also yield different
hypotheses from Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping (e.g.
Section 3.3).
2. Type 1 and Type 2 processes
Type 1 and Type 2 processes are each a class of cogni-
tive processes characterized by markedly different fea-
tures. Type 1 processes are defined by being
autonomous and not requiring working memory, and
are often characterized as fast, parallel, nonconscious,
and associative (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). They are
intuitive and are involved in the kinds of rapid and
implicit judgments people make, for example, when
judging someone’s looks. They are autonomous in that
they don’t require reflection; for example, judging
someone based on stereotypes is automatic, and the
process itself can’t be rationally vetoed (Devine, 1989).
Type 2 processes are defined by a relative cognitive
decoupling from the immediate context, as well as by
requiring working memory. These processes are reflec-
tive rather than intuitive. Often, they are slow, serial,
conscious, and rule-based.
The only essential features are requiring (or not)
working memory and either autonomy or cognitive
decoupling. However, the correlates can be understood
as typical ways that Type 1 and Type 2 attributes clus-
ter (Evans, 2008; Samuels, 2009). This nonrigid align-
ment alleviates many of the critiques that have been
leveled against dual-process theories (Pennycook et al.,
2018), particularly that they posit an inflexible and
starkly dualistic view of mind (Bargh, 1994; Melnikoff
& Bargh, 2018). Some dual-process theorists take the
two kinds of mental processes to form two distinct cog-
nitive systems (e.g. Sloman, 1996), sometimes called
‘‘System 1’’ and ‘‘System 2.’’ Samuels (2009) calls this
the ‘‘Token Thesis’’: each kind is a token of a cognitive
system. The alternative is the ‘‘Type Thesis’’: each kind
marks a type of cognitive process, but there are many
tokens of these types. In agreement with Samuels and
Evans and Stanovich (2013), I assume the Type Thesis
is the more plausible option. Given that the brain is
composed of such a diversity of subsystems, it is hard
to see how plausibly to divide the mind into only two
systems. Type 1 processes are typically the default, and
Type 2 processes may intervene when called for
(Stanovich, 2011). Alternatively, they may both be per-
vasively active (De Neys, 2017). Stereotypes, for exam-
ple, characteristically involve Type 1 processes, while
mathematical reasoning characteristically involves
Type 2 processes. Nonetheless, stereotypes may be ela-
borated on by conscious thought, and math may
involve fast and automatic recognition. Acknowledging
that many real tasks can be performed by a combined
effort of Type 1 and Type 2 processes also alleviates
the critique that some automatic processes, such as
driving, can also be controlled (Section 3.3; cf. Bargh,
1994). The Type 1 and Type 2 distinction ultimately
leaves open the question of whether other types of pro-
cesses may exist (Evans, 2008).
2.1. Architectural features
There are broad architectural differences between Type
1 and Type 2 processes. Type 1 architecture is mas-
sively parallel, based in the recurrent networks of the
brain’s approximately 86 billion neurons (Azevedo et
al., 2009), which form a dynamical system (Freeman,
2000). They function associatively through the pickup
of statistical regularities in inputs. Similarity and
Table 1. A summary of Type 1 and Type 2 processes. From
Evans and Stanovich (2013, p. 225), this list is an influential
account, though not all dual-process theorists would accept
every item (Evans, 2008).
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temporal order are particularly salient elements of these
regularities (Sloman, 1996). Things that look alike or
that are temporally contiguous will typically become
associated with one another. Such associations are the
basis of the prototypes and stereotypes that guide much
of human cognition.
This parallel architecture allows for a rapid process-
ing speed. We can contrast this with a simplified
GOFAI (Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence)
system based on serial, symbolic computation, which
might recognize a bird by iteratively posing a series of
questions:
Does it have a beak?
YES




Then it is a bird.
This is a slow and cumbersome way to activate con-
cepts, most of which have fuzzy borders anyway. It is
much faster to recognize a bird by allowing incoming
visual information to pass spreading activation across
distributed nodes for beak, wings, and flying, thereby
activating a prototype or concept. Whereas the sym-
bolic approach iterates one step at a time, these nodes
may be activated in tandem. When several distributed
nodes are activated, the prototype or concept is acti-
vated. Such automatic, spreading activation is the rea-
son why advertisers can expect viewers to automatically
take the person in a medical coat selling toothpaste as
trustworthy: the concept of a medical doctor is acti-
vated by visual information, but that activation spreads
to other nodes of the concept, like trustworthiness. It
takes effortful, propositional thought to actively veto
those automatic associations (Devine, 1989).
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By contrast, Type 2 processes are inherently unified
by their utilization of working memory (Carruthers,
2015; Evans & Stanovich, 2013), a function associated
with the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia, among
other regions (Kriete et al., 2013). For example, Goel
et al. (2000) showed that although different forms of
syllogistic reasoning (a predominantly Type 2 task)
recruit different brain regions, they nonetheless share a
common basis in the basal ganglia, left prefrontal cor-
tex, and other areas associated with working memory.
This foundation in working memory means they are
often at least partly conscious processes (Carruthers,
2015; Faghihi et al., 2015). Type 1 processes, however,
do not share a common basis in working memory or
any other system, and they are not paradigmatically
conscious processes.
Type 2 processes are based in the same parallel archi-
tecture of the brain, but they lead to seriality at a beha-
vioral level. They are a kind of emulated or virtual
machine running on the parallel architecture of the
brain (Dennett, 1991). Enumerating things one by one,
speaking words in a sentence, or progressively monitor-
ing one part of a scene to another are examples of the
behavioral seriality of Type 2 processes. Furthermore,
different Type 2 processes cannot execute at the same
time; at most, they can timeshare or multitask. This
behavioral seriality is a constraint of the working mem-
ory that they must all pass through. Type 1 processes,
however, are both neurally and behaviorally parallel.
Multiple Type 1 processes can execute simultaneously
because they are autonomous instead of controlled by
attentional processes (like working memory’s ‘‘central
executive’’; Baddeley, 2007).
Relative to the parallel Type 1 processes, Type 2 pro-
cesses are highly constrained in their speed. The syntac-
tical processing of speech production, subvocalization,
planning, rational thought, mathematics, formal logic,
and other rule-based processes is all functionally serial
in nature. For example, you are reading this sentence
word-by-word, from left to right, and it is not possible
to read it en bloc. That is fundamentally different from
how we perceive birds or any other prototype, which is
en bloc rather than sequential. We may note that in
some cases of expert judgment, judgments can also be
very fast (Bargh, 1994). But this may be indicative that
the judgments themselves arise not from Type 2 pro-
cesses, like the nonexpert, but have become automa-
tized or based on pattern-recognition, as with chess
masters (Kahneman, 2011).
Serial processing creates a bottlenecking of system
resources around the serial operation, a phenomenon
known as the ‘‘von Neumann bottleneck’’ (see Figure
1). The seriality, in this case, is behavioral rather than
strictly neural. Even if multimodal information is avail-
able all at once, it can only be processed one at a time
in working memory—despite the parallelism of its
neural underpinnings. The von Neumann bottleneck
results in slower processing, essentially because other
items must wait for their turn. It is like a traffic jam
caused by only one lane being opened while the others
are undergoing repairs.
Unlike the virtually limitless capacity of long-term
memory, working memory has a far more limited
capacity (Cowan, 2016). Consider the following para-
dox. We can seamlessly drive, field balls, or hike
through a winding path. The best artificial intelligence
of the early 21st century is only beginning to match
these capacities, and they require vast computational
resources. And yet, a humble calculator can beat us at
simple mental math. The dual-process answer to this
paradox is that mental math is constitutively a different
kind of cognitive process, one utilizing the limited
resources of working memory and subject to the von
Neumann bottleneck. But what we lose in speed, we
gain in power, as mathematical cognition can poten-
tially solve for any novel combination of symbols.
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Many Type 2 processes are often capable of being
subjected to standards of normative or discursive rea-
soning. These norms are established within institutions
and communities and include rules of logic, inference,
induction, mathematics, and discourse. Violations of
these norms can be discovered by applying a rule, such
as grammar. Regarding Type 1 processes, there are two
views. Many consider them to be irrational, particularly
because they are often associated with biases in reason-
ing (Kahneman, 2011). However, it would be hard to
understand why humans would have evolved cognitive
mechanisms that were outright ‘‘irrational’’ unless they
confer some adaptive advantage. Indeed, Type 1 pro-
cesses produce the right results most of the time. For
example, making a Type 1 automatic, intuitive associa-
tion between wearing a suit and being wealthy will often
be right, even though there are other cases where the
association will prove incorrect. But what does ‘‘the
right results’’ mean in this context?
We can understand Type 1 processes as manifesting
a form of instrumental rationality, which is achieved by
pursuing goals in a suitable manner (Evans, 2007;
Evans & Over, 1996). Communal norms may guide this
instrumental rationality, but they are unwritten norms
of practice rather than codified rules. Although they are
rule-describable, they are not rule-based (see Franklin,
1995). Furthermore, a proper means-ends relationship
must hold, which is also a normative standard. To
avoid confusion, I will refer to Type 2 processes as hav-
ing discursive rationality (i.e., when they do fulfill this
criterion). If the agent’s goal is epistemic, then Type 1
processes may prove faulty, just as those who claim
Type 1 processes are ‘‘irrational’’ might claim. But
agents’ primary goals in life are not epistemic but rather
pragmatic. Agents are oriented toward action in an
environment full of affordances. If the agent’s goals are
pragmatic rather than truth-oriented, then the intuitive
association between wearing a suit and being wealthy
will often be good enough (for example). The associa-
tion can help facilitate social interaction according to
social scripts and social affordances. Type 1 processes
are only ‘‘irrational’’ if we don’t consider the agent’s
pragmatic orientation in the world (something which
my Heideggerian interpretation of dual-process theory
will emphasize; Section 3.2).
3. Smooth coping
The term ‘‘smooth coping’’ is a more recent coinage,
but it refers to Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/2012) phenomen-
ology of the body and, ultimately, to Heidegger’s (1928/
2010) phenomenology of Zuhandenheit. Translated as
‘‘readiness-to-hand’’ or ‘‘handiness,’’ Zuhandenheit refers
to the pervasive, pragmatic disposition with which a
human agent approaches the world. Heidegger picks
out Zuhandenheit to note that this pragmatic mode is
often elided in theoretical accounts of human existence,
where Vorhandenheit (‘‘presence-at-hand’’ or ‘‘objective
presence’’) is considered paradigmatic of human cogni-
tion. Vorhandenheit is a theoretical mode of
Figure 1. (a) Serial processing creates a von Neumann bottleneck. In this example, different aspects of a bird are processed serially,
resulting in an identification of ‘‘bird’’: ‘‘It has a beak, it’s in the sky, it has wings, and it has claws. It must be a bird.’’ While this is an
inefficient route to object categorization, it is absolutely essential in linguistic, mathematical, and logical thought, such as in the
equation ‘‘7x + 1 = 35,’’ or even in controlled, conscious attention (Baars, 1988). (b) Parallel processing, as in connectionist
networks, involves a spreading activation across distributed nodes, all operating simultaneously. Different feature nodes pass
spreading activation to the concept ‘‘bird’’ all at once. No von Neumann bottleneck is created.
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approaching the world, characteristic of the modern
project of science, particularly in the wake of Galileo,
Locke, and Kant, particularly manifest in discursive
rationality.
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On H. L. Dreyfus’ (2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2013) influ-
ential view, Zuhandenheit involves smooth coping
through sensorimotor skills and embodied action, mod-
eled on Aristotelian phronesis. Aristotelian phronesis is
a practical wisdom based on situational factors. Unlike
theoretical reason, it is largely learned through indirect
training and upbringing. It is a practice rather than a
theoretical attainment. It forms a bulk of skillful human
action, such as walking and driving, but this action is
‘‘mindless,’’ meaning that it is nonrational. Dreyfus pits
his claims against McDowell (2007a, 2007b, 2013), who
argues that phronesis as embodied action is pervaded
with conceptual structures rather than divorced from
them.
In Dreyfus’ view, which he attributes to Heidegger,
rationality and concepts are more limited in scope to
theoretical and discursive practices:
Heidegger points out that most of our activities don’t
involve concepts at all ... Indeed, in our everyday coping,
which he calls ‘‘pressing into possibilities,’’ we don’t deal
with objects with general properties like weight, nor with
situation-specific aspects like too heavy. Rather, when
everything is going well and we are absorbed in our cop-
ing, the equipment we are using ‘‘withdraws’’ ... Then there
is no place for a demonstrative concept pointing out our
equipment as anything. We do not attribute a general
property or even a situation-specific aspect to it; we just
cope. (H. L. Dreyfus, 2007a, pp. 371–372)
Dreyfus’ interpretation of Heidegger has been sub-
ject to several critiques. First, Dreyfus tends to identify
smooth coping with expert performance and states of
flow in sport. Yet Heidegger does not focus on levels of
skill, and Zuhandenheit applies equally to ‘‘the skills
needed to go through a door, write a letter, or sit down
in a chair’’ (Breivik, 2007, p. 123). This seems to be a
point H. L. Dreyfus (2013) later concedes, however,
when he notes that walking is a form of smooth coping.
My discussion of smooth coping takes this critique seri-
ously and considers a wide range of embodied action
beyond expert performance. And, as Breivik notes, just
because we perform something regularly does not
necessarily mean we gain mastery.
I argue that smooth coping primarily consists of
Type 1 processes (although in some cases, particularly
in Dreyfus’ examples of expert action, Type 2 processes
also contribute). Using Heidegger’s phenomenology of
calculation, understanding, and interpretation, I will
argue for the interpretation of Type 1 not as irrational
or nonrational, but rather as evincing an embodied
rationality.
In Being and Time, Heidegger (1928/2010) develops
a phenomenological account of Dasein, which is
roughly embodied existence from a first-person per-
spective.
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Dasein has two fundamental modes of enga-
ging with the world based on its care (Sorge), its
affective and motivational structure. One mode is prag-
matic and prereflective, meaning that it is more primor-
dial to intellectualized reflection. Heidegger calls this
mode ‘‘circumspection’’ (Umsicht). In circumspection,
agents encounter things in the world as handy or
ready-to-hand (zuhanden). Heidegger identifies this
mode with Aristotelian phronesis and calls the things
we encounter in it ‘‘equipment’’ (Zeug).
For Heidegger, equipment is an ontological category
that differs from objects insofar as it has an inherently
referential structure. Objects for Heidegger are contem-
plated through the detached, scientific mode of
reasoning (Vorhandenheit). In this mode, objects are
considered independent and self-standing; for example,
a gold bar is just the collection of its properties of hard-
ness, mass, and reflectance. Equipment, however, is not
independent but always refers to some action; for
example, a gold bar is a thing I use to exchange for
money. It is the same gold bar in both examples, but
the difference is how I comport myself to it. As an
‘‘object’’ (in Heidegger’s language), the gold bar is an
object of theoretical or scientific inquiry, while as
equipment it is used for something. In circumspection,
everything is encountered as equipment. Heidegger’s
point is that we do not primarily engage with the world
through theoretical reason.
For example, a hammer is useful for hammering,
that is, it is handy (zuhanden). A hammer can be
approached circumspectly in terms of its affordances. It
affords picking up, holding, swinging, and hammering.
We encounter the hammer in terms of its affordances
when we are engaged in practical activities, and the tool
becomes part of a pragmatic network of other equip-
ment useful for fulfilling a goal or intention. However,
‘‘[w]hen we look at things ‘theoretically,’ we lack an
understanding of handiness [Zuhandenheit]’’ (p. 69).
When we approach the hammer in terms of its brute
material attributes (e.g. it weighs 1 kg, it is made of
wood and steel), we no longer approach it in terms of
its affordances. This is the approach of Vorhandenheit.
Zuhandenheit is mostly identified with embodied,
smooth coping. This is the basic, preconceptual level of
Zuhandenheit, but Heidegger also claims there is a deri-
vative mode of Zuhandenheit that is still a pragmatic
form of phronesis, but which involves propositional
thought. This derivative level of Zuhandenheit is what I
will characterize as a hybrid Type 1–Type 2 situation.
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The basic level of Zuhandenheit is not propositional
and can be characterized as mediated by affordances. I
will argue this basic level predominantly consists of
Type 1 processes.
This interpretation conflicts with Stuart Dreyfus’ (2014)
embodied dual-process theory, according to which smooth
coping constitutes a System 0—or, to maintain consistency
with the terminology used in this article, ‘‘Type 0’’—sepa-
rate from Type 1 and 2 processes. Stuart Dreyfus claims
that, unlike intuitive, Type 1 judgments, Type 0 processes
are not judgments and are based in a neurologically sepa-
rate habitual, striatal memory system from the declarative
memory of Type 1 and Type 2 processes. Yet, I will argue
that smooth coping does not significantly differ from other
Type 1 processes. It satisfies the criteria for Type 1 features
and correlates (see Table 1). These criteria are based on
Evans and Stanovich (2013), but replace biased responses
with embodied rationality (Evans & Over, 1996).
Smooth coping
1. doesn’t require working memory and is autonomous
(Section 3.1),
2. manifests embodied rationality (rather than biased
responses) (Section 3.2),
3. is parallel and high capacity (Section 3.3),
4. is fast and largely nonconscious (but may manifest
prereflective consciousness) (Section 3.4), and
5. is contextualized and associative (through sensori-
motor attunement) (Section 3.5).
Of the criteria above, those listed in Numbers 2 to 5
are typical correlates, and so their presence in smooth
coping is not an absolute mark of being a Type 1 pro-
cess, as the conditions in Number 1 are. However, by
showing that both the necessary conditions and the
typical correlates of Type 1 processes are evinced in
smooth coping, I aim to make a stronger and more
convincing case. Furthermore, I aim to identify idio-
syncratic elements that follow from a Heideggerian
approach to dual-process theory, particularly concern-
ing embodied rationality, prereflective consciousness,
and sensorimotor attunement.
3.1. Working memory and autonomy
The two central defining features of Type 1 processes is
that they don’t rely on working memory and are auton-
omous. Based on these two criteria, Furley et al. (2015)
argue that embodied skills are predominantly executed
by Type 1 processes, and their defense can be extended
to smooth coping more generally. Much of embodied
action is procedural rather than declarative:
Retrieving procedural knowledge does not require the
same amount of controlled attention as declarative knowl-
edge ... [A] highly practiced soccer player does not need to
attend to the execution of dribbling the ball, which allows
him to utilize his freed attentional resources for other
aspects of the sport, such as scanning for open team-mates.
(Furley et al., 2015, p. 114)
Controlled attention is a feature of working memory,
something Baddeley (2007) calls the ‘‘central executive.’’
The central executive directs attention to elements in
the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological loop,
that is, to the visual and auditory modalities. This
attentional direction is necessary to sustain focus and
prevent the diversion of attention to other salient fea-
tures and affordances in the environment. For example,
sitting in a café and planning out a vacation requires
that one be not continually distracted by ambient
sounds, lights, and other people.
But embodied skills (and smooth coping more gen-
erally) often do not require such sustained attention
(Furley et al., 2015), at least for mundane skills.
Walking, for example, is mostly executed without much
controlled attention at all. Some expert performance
does involve intense attention, but I will discuss these
as cases with mixed Type 1 and Type 2 processes in
Section 3.3. Walking, driving, typing, and many other
mundane embodied skills are correlatively autono-
mous, given that they do not require working memory
to function (at least, for the experienced person).
Indeed, the autonomy of different embodied actions is
one reason why H. L. Dreyfus (2005, 2013) contends
that smooth coping is ‘‘mindless’’—it doesn’t require
focused attention or thought. Smooth coping typically
operates in the background of awareness, and when
embodied action does become the object of attention
and reasoning, it often loses its speed and fluency.
3.2. Biased responses and instrumental rationality
Biased responses are a typical indication of Type 1 pro-
cesses and are a mark of irrationality. If smooth coping
is a Type 1 process, as I argue, then that would seem to
strengthen Dreyfus’ case for it being ‘‘mindless.’’ Yet, it
is not clear what a biased response would even mean in
the context of embodied action. As an attribute, ‘‘biased
response’’ make sense when we are studying reasoning
(Wason & Evans, 1974) or stereotypes (Devine, 1989),
but is of little use when we are studying embodied
action. However, this problem disappears if we replace
that criterion with that of instrumental rationality, as
opposed to the discursive rationality of Type 2 pro-
cesses (Evans, 2007; Evans & Over, 1996). As I previ-
ously argued (section 2.1), considerations of bias and
irrationality assume a paradigm with an epistemically
oriented agent. But if we instead regard the agent as
action-oriented, then Type 1 processes rather manifest
an instrumental rationality, pursuing an adequate
means to an end.
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One of the central thrusts of Heidegger’s (1928/2010)
Being and Time is undermining the view of agents as
essentially epistemic agents. For Heidegger, people are
not primarily ‘‘knowers,’’ but rather ‘‘doers.’’ This is
one of the primary roles that Zuhandenheit plays in that
text. Vorhandenheit is the theoretical or epistemic orien-
tation, but Heidegger claims that our basic experience
of the world is not in the domain of Vorhandenheit. We
are primarily pragmatic beings, seeking goals according
to our cares or desires, and only secondarily are we
knowers. Given this assumption, the appropriate Type
1 criterion is not bias but rather instrumental rational-
ity (Evans & Over, 1996).
According to H. L. Dreyfus (2007b), smooth coping
in Heidegger is ‘‘non-conceptual, non-propositional,
non-rational (even if rational means situation-specific)
and non-linguistic’’ (p. 360). For Dreyfus, the field of
affordances in coping ‘‘works in the background to
make rationality possible, but the system of solicita-
tions is not itself rational’’ (p. 358). Dreyfus criticizes
McDowell for claiming that rationality is pervasive
within coping and accuses him of mistaking the ability
to retrospectively give reasons for an action with the
rationality of that action itself. This is a category mis-
take, concludes H. L. Dreyfus (2007a): just because
conceptual capacities can be exercised at any time, it
does not mean they actually are operative.
There are several reasons to think that smooth cop-
ing is quite rational. Heidegger describes Dasein as
doing ‘‘calculation’’ (Berechnung) for spatial relations.
However, Heidegger distinguishes between two forms
of spatial calculation: a theoretical and geometric
approach, and a circumspect calculation (umsichtige
Berechnung) (pp. 108–112). The theoretical approach to
spatial calculation grasps spatial relations geometri-
cally. This is the space of Kantian outer intuition or of
mathematics. However, the circumspect calculation of
spatial relations grasps equipment in terms of how near
or far it is. This nearness or farness is not a distance as
measured in meters but is a practical sense of how
much time and effort it will take me to get to there. In
other words, it is action-oriented. One example of cir-
cumspect spatial calculation is while walking uphill, I
sense that the peak of the hill is far. Far is a relative
term. The smooth coping operating in this situation
relates to my previous experiences of walking to get the
sense of farness and factors in my current and antici-
pated fatigue.
Furthermore, one of the Dasein’s fundamental (exis-
tenzial) structures is understanding. Typically, under-
standing is something we would conceive of as a
higher-order and symbolic propositional understand-
ing. But for Heidegger, such propositional understand-
ing, which may generate statements and language, is a
‘‘derivative form’’ (pp. 149–154). It is derivative of
understanding as a fundamental existential structure,
which is a form of know-how. ‘‘In understanding as an
existential, the thing we are able to do is not a what,
but being ... as existing’’ (Heidegger, 1928/2010, pp.
139–143). Heidegger explains that understanding is
grasping the possibilities of Dasein and of the world.
‘‘What is at hand is discovered as such in its serviceabil-
ity, usability, detrimentality’’ (pp. 140–144). That is,
understanding is the grasping both of affordances and
of the agent’s corresponding embodied capacities.
Understanding is realized as a project, wherein Dasein
projects itself into the world and achieves particular
aims. Smooth coping involves an understanding that is
directed toward projects, that is, that is goal-oriented.
Understanding is the basis of interpretation. As a
derivative mode of Zuhandenheit, interpretation can
involve basic propositional reasoning about useful
things in the environment. And a full-blown interpre-
tive project may quite heavily involve Type 2 processes.
But as with understanding, interpretation is also a basic
structure of Dasein and smooth coping. The agent does
not have a pure, unmediated perception of the world,
as in pure sense data that are subsequently interpreted.
Instead, they perceive and understand within a holistic
context, and their perception is always already inter-
preted. All perception and action, according to
Heidegger (1928/2010), is interpretive:
The circumspect, interpretive dealing with what is at hand
in the surrounding world which ‘‘sees’’ this as a table, a
door, a car, a bridge does not necessarily already have to
analyze what is circumspectly interpreted in a particular
statement. Any simple prepredicative seeing of what is at
hand is in itself already understanding and interpretive.
(pp. 144–149)
For Heidegger, we do not see splotches of red and
green color, but we see a red rose. It is the splotches of
color that are an abstraction from our immediate expe-
rience. The holistic context in which I realize my possi-
bilities and projects is not pregiven but is interpreted
based on my past experiences, enculturation, and goals.
Interpretation is based on understanding, and like
understanding, its derivative mode can be used to gen-
erate statements and language, but it is not fundamen-
tally propositional in format (pp. 140–144).
Accordingly, for Heidegger, smooth coping involves
calculation, understanding, and interpretation. Coping
is calculating insofar as it determines action-oriented
spatial relations. It has understanding insofar as it
grasps affordances and capacities for action according
to projects or goals. And it interprets insofar as all sen-
sorimotor action and perception are always already
interpreted according to a holistic context. These three
capabilities all have corresponding propositional
modes, as when Dasein measures distances, under-
stands a statement, or interprets a text. But these are
derivative of the fundamental structures of Dasein.
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Dreyfus’ interpretation of Heidegger on smooth coping
is deficient on two points. First, he does not distinguish
low-level Zuhandenheit from hybrid forms of
Zuhandenheit. Second, he insists that the lower-level
smooth coping is nonrational, essentially because he
understands rationality as essentially Type 2 discursive
rationality. Yet if our paradigm is action-orientation,
we are no longer assuming a primarily epistemic agent.
The criterion of bias and irrationality should be
replaced with that of instrumental rationality. And
Heidegger’s discussion of smooth coping’s calculation,
understanding, and interpretation all are ways that an
agent achieves its goals in a suitable manner—hence,
coping is smooth.
Our ability to interact with affordances is based on
learning sensorimotor patterns associated with very
particular environmental and stimulus conditions.
These sensorimotor patterns satisfice in the right envi-
ronmental conditions. That is, they get the job done,
but as patterns of action, they are inflexible and unable
to adapt rapidly to novel conditions without training.
Sensorimotor attunement is always to specific environ-
ments, and we lose that attunement as we find ourselves
in new environments. For example, being a good driver
under normal conditions does not transfer to driving on
an icy road. The conditions differ just enough to make
the sensorimotor skills possibly fail. Sensorimotor pat-
terns are not rule-based but instead are designed to
work well in the right situations. On the contrary, if we
understand the rules of formal logical derivation, we
ought to be able to solve problems we have never seen
before.
We can more expansively call the instrumental
rationality of smooth coping an ‘‘embodied rationality’’
to emphasize that the agent’s accomplishment of its
goals is fundamentally through sensorimotor engage-
ment with the world. ‘‘Embodied rationality’’ has been
invoked as a way to explain that apparently ‘‘irrational’’
biases in human thought make sense when we under-
stand their bases in human embodiment (Spellman &
Schnall, 2009). According to Gallagher (2015, 2018),
embodied rationality generates a rational structure in
action and in the world, which he exemplifies with the
human hand. In reaching out to grasp an object, the
hand close-to-automatically ‘‘(and without the agent’s
conscious awareness) shapes itself into just the right
posture to form the most appropriate grip’’ (Gallagher,
2018, p. 88). In Gallagher’s (2015) view, embodied
rationality manifests when the body copes with the
world with appropriate forms of grip:
If I reach to grab an apple in order to take a bite, the
shape of my grasp is different from when I reach to grab a
banana, but also different from when I reach to grab the
apple to throw it. (p. 139)
As Rolla (2021) states it, embodied rationality (or
what he calls ‘‘Radically Enactive Rationality’’) is when
‘‘an organism acts rationally insofar as it maintains a
proficient interaction with its environment, coordinat-
ing its cognitive abilities according to environmental
constraints’’ (p. 7). But proficient interaction with the
environment alone is not sufficient to indicate rational-
ity. Consider the psychopathological case of alien hand
syndrome, where a hand can be experienced as not
under one’s control. The hand still operates through
smooth sensorimotor engagement, but it is no longer
achieving the agent’s goals. We would be hard-pressed
to call this process ‘‘rational.’’ What needs to be added
to Rolla’s definition is that it is proficient for achieving
the agent’s goals, making it a form of instrumental
rationality. The hand that reaches out to grasp the
apple in the right way is accomplishing the agent’s
goals. The ‘‘right way’’ is contingent upon not only the
individual’s capacities and the situational constraints
but also upon the agent’s goals. For example, if my goal
is to eat the apple, and it is right on the table before me,
then I may grab it in such a way to facilitate eating. But
if my goal is to throw it, I may grab it and wind it back
in preparation to throw it. Embodied rationality just is
an instrumental rationality that is fulfilled through
embodied, action-oriented means. Although smooth
coping may not evince biased responses (as a typical
Type 1 correlate), that criterion assumes that an agent
is primarily epistemically oriented. But if we assume a
primarily action-oriented agent (as Heidegger sup-
ports), then the salient Type 1 criterion is instrumental
rationality rather than bias (Evans, 2007; Evans &
Over, 1996)—something that smooth coping does
evince.
3.3. High capacity and parallel
Smooth coping is not sequential and does not function
through rules, procedures, language, logic, or serial
attention. During smooth coping, multiple sensorimo-
tor processes can operate in parallel to create an emer-
gent behavioral totality. The relevant sense of
parallelism here is behavioral, engaging in multiple
activities in tandem. For example, an expert driver
effortlessly turns the steering wheel, visually scans the
road, presses the brake and gas pedals, monitors the
instrument panel, and uses turning signals. Steering
and scanning the road involve different sensory modal-
ities, different motor processes, and different brain
regions. They can be performed in tandem without a
hit to performance. These embodied processes are high
capacity, far exceeding what can be held in the contents
of working memory.
8 Adaptive Behavior
Not only can the expert driver steer the wheel, regu-
late the pressure on the gas pedal, and scan the road all
at the same time. Driving skills are largely performed
unconsciously, at least for the expert driver. This does
not mean that the driver is unconscious, but that most
of the sensorimotor adjustments and skillful actions
they perform while driving do not require working
memory and are mostly unreportable. In addition,
expert drivers can simultaneously engage in a conversa-
tion while driving. However, this does not make con-
versation another Type 1 process. Conversations are a
complex case, involving both Type 1 and Type 2 pro-
cesses. At the level of the propositions themselves, con-
versations are slow, linguistic, sequential, follow
grammatical and Gricean norms, and hence strongly
involve Type 2 processes. Furthermore, they are per-
formed quite consciously, with subjects being able to
report on their own sentence constructions. Type 1 pro-
cesses are still involved in conversation, as conversing
involves gesticulation, tonality, and other non-linguistic
factors (see Gallagher, 2017), but the linguistic aspects
more heavily involve Type 2 processes.
In the case of driving and talking, Type 1 and Type 2
processes can be engaged simultaneously without a sig-
nificant performance hit to either. However, Type 2
processes are behaviorally serial and can only be per-
formed one at a time. At best, one can switch rapidly
between two Type 2 tasks (‘‘multitasking’’).
4
While ordi-
nary driving principally engages Type 1 processes, driv-
ing in heavy traffic additionally engages Type 2
processes, utilizing working memory resources in order
to engage in a higher-order monitoring of smooth cop-
ing. Once a driver hits heavy traffic, fluent conversation
cannot continue without higher-order monitoring and
reasoning about the situation taking a performance hit.
We can infer from this that driving in heavy traffic and
conversing are competing processes to the extent they
engage Type 2 processes. Namely, they compete for the
resources of working memory and attention. As we
know, working memory capacity is quite small (Cowan,
2016), and Type 1 processes do not utilize its resources.
Compared with the limited resources of working mem-
ory, Type 1 parallel processing is very high bandwidth
and can juggle multiple demanding sensorimotor pro-
cesses simultaneously. There is no competition for
resources or performance hits when we drive in normal
conditions and hold a conversation because the pro-
cesses underlying these two actions are fundamentally
different.
Dreyfus’ view, however, yields distinctly different
hypotheses. According to Dreyfus, smooth coping is
disrupted by propositional and reflective thinking,
whereas on our model, these are not competing pro-
cesses. ‘‘I grant that, when we are absorbed in everyday
skillful coping, we have the capacity to step back and
reflect but I think it should be obvious that we cannot
exercise that capacity without disrupting our coping’’
(H. L. Dreyfus, 2007b). In Dreyfus’ view, reflective
processes (Type 2) should interrupt our smooth coping.
H. L. Dreyfus (2007a) claims that even something as
basic as walking can be disrupted by reflective con-
sciousness (p. 373).
Gallagher recalls an encounter with Dreyfus, who
claimed that for the skier
[t]he presence of a reflective (thoughtful) element necessa-
rily disturbs the expert performance. I offered my own
response to this, which was that I thought expertise would
include knowing when to reflect, and how to reflect, and
what to think about in terms of anticipating changes in
snow texture. (Gallagher, 2015, p. 136)
Several authors have mounted similar critiques of
Dreyfus’ model. It makes athletes ‘‘almost like zombies
when they move around’’ (Breivik, 2013, p. 96).
Montero (2015) argues that cases in which performance
does diminish due to reflection may be because the sub-
jects do not know what to reflect on properly. But, as
in the Gallagher quote above, the expert would know
precisely when, how, and on what to reflect. And that
reflection may not necessarily be about the
environment—it may even be about one’s own body
(Toner et al., 2016).
Our dual-process model explains how it is possible
to simultaneously drive and be engaged in a conversa-
tion, or simultaneously walk and reflect, which would
be puzzling on the Dreyfusian account. Høffding’s
(2019) critique of Dreyfus focuses on the stark dualism
of his account: either smooth coping or reflection and
reasoning is in force, but not both. And Breivik (2007)
worries that dividing smooth coping into something
achieved by two separate processes does not capture
the breadth of nuances of Heideggerian Zuhandenheit.
We can resolve this issue by recalling that Heidegger
allows for a derivative level of Zuhandenheit where one
can give reasons and yet still be engaged in smooth
coping. In other words, we should identify smooth cop-
ing with the foundational level of Zuhandenheit, and a
hybrid situation of smooth coping and Type 2 reflective
processes with the derivative mode of Zuhandenheit.
This nuance alleviates both Høffding’s and Breivik’s
worries.
The kind of intense concentration we see in expert
action is the hallmark of Type 2, not Type 1, precisely
because conscious attention is a Type 2 correlate
(which follows from working memory’s central execu-
tive). Type 1 processes, however, are mostly uncon-
scious and do not require intense attention, as with
driving. That conscious attention operates serially and
far more slowly than the smooth coping that it works
in tandem with. The performer cannot simultaneously
concentrate their attention on everything their body is
doing, because attention cannot be spread in a parallel
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manner like that. They would attend to some highly
salient feature, while smooth coping handles everything
else. For example, the skier may attend to the look of
the snow or to the slope gradient, reason about changes
in gradients, and anticipate changes in the slopes, while
their body semi-automatically makes microadjustments
in posture and foot position. This monitoring and rea-
soning may very well be procedural or rule-based, and
they allow for a limited planning, for example, antici-
pating a change in the slope ahead. It does not have to
be as rapid as smooth coping because it is more nar-
rowly focused.
If the expert performer were to switch suddenly to a
different reflective task, this would most certainly dis-
rupt their coping. However, that is because the expert
performance relies on both systems, involving coping
and reflective monitoring, and not because they were
never reflecting to begin with, as Dreyfus claims. This
is what happens when a driver hits heavy traffic, where-
upon they will usually stop talking. They were using
Type 2 processes and their working memory resources
for conversation, and they now switch tasks to high-
level reasoning about the embodied situation. If they
were to start conversing again, this would indeed dis-
rupt their coping in the heavy traffic, but only because
driving in heavy traffic is a skill that requires both sys-
tems (whereas driving in light traffic largely relies on
Type 1 processes). On the dual-process model, starting
to reflect where previously one was only coping would
not disturb that coping, contra Dreyfus. This happens
quite frequently, in fact, as with driving while talking
or walking while thinking.
3.4. Fast and nonconscious
The parallel embodied processes of smooth coping are
also fast, another Type 1 correlate. Smooth coping is
rapid compared with more deliberate and controlled
action. It involves ongoing and online microadjust-
ments controlled in parallel through the motor cortices,
cerebellum, motor ganglia, and muscles in interaction
with the environment. The speed of its sensorimotor
control is what allows it to outperform deliberative
action, something that is particularly noticeable in
expert action like skiing. When embodied movements
become the objects of deliberate, Type 2 control, utiliz-
ing working memory, sensorimotor tasks become chal-
lenging and effortful. H. L. Dreyfus (2007b) gives the
example of Chuck Knoblauch, a star baseball player
who lost the ability to pitch well. According to Dreyfus,
this loss of performance occurred because Knoblauch
began interrupting his smooth coping by thinking
about how to perform the action. In Section 3.3,
however, we ruled out explanations to the effect that
Type 2 processes interrupt Type 1 processes, at least in
typical cases. In Knoblauch’s case, our dual-process
model would instead predict that the normal Type 2
reasoning is interrupted by a different Type 2 process
(similar to Eysenck et al., 2007). Type 2 processes
would normally monitor Knoblauch’s baseball perfor-
mance and intervene in coping in very limited ways.
Instead, they likely became preoccupied with something
else. Type 2 processes do not interrupt Type 1 processes
by their mere presence, as Dreyfus claims.
Smooth coping is also largely nonconscious, another
Type 1 correlate. This does not mean that the agent is
necessarily unconscious while engaged in smooth cop-
ing, like a ‘‘zombie’’ (Breivik, 2013). Type 2 processes
may be actively and consciously engaged in the situa-
tion, as well. Furthermore, smooth coping is often char-
acterized by what phenomenologists call ‘‘prereflective’’
consciousness. Heidegger (1928/2010, pp. 74, 73) refers
to circumspection as being ‘‘unthematic’’ or prepredica-
tive. We are absorbed in the world, which is ‘‘already
discovered beforehand together with everything
encountered, although not thematically [unthematisch]’’
(pp. 81–83). Heidegger also refers to the theoretical or
reflective mode as ‘‘thematic’’ (p. 75). ‘‘Theme’’ is a term
from Husserl indicating the theme–horizon structure of
phenomenal consciousness. Some object may be the
theme of consciousness, and that theme is surrounded
by a horizon of related but less clear things, or what
William James (1890/1983) called the ‘‘fringe’’:
I was just now reflecting, when a whistle from the street
momentarily distracts me from my theme (a theme I am
thinking about here). I focus for a moment on the sound,
but then quickly return to the old theme. My apprehen-
sion of the sound is not erased, I am still conscious of the
whistle in a modified way, but it is no longer in my mental
grip. (Husserl, 1913/2014, p. 243–254)
Heidegger invokes the Husserlian terminology, and
equates the theoretical comportment with theme, and
circumspection (smooth coping) with the unthematic.
Heidegger (1928/2010) tells us that ‘‘handiness is ...
understood, although not thematically [unthematisch],
in dealing with what is at hand. It does not just disap-
pear, but bids farewell, so to speak, in the conspicuous-
ness of what is unusable’’ (pp. 73, 74). Something is
conspicuous when it is grasped in the theoretical com-
portment. Handiness, and hence equipment grasped
through their affordances, fades as equipment becomes
a thematic object.
Heidegger (2005) explicitly characterizes ‘‘objects’’ as
thematic. ‘‘‘Object’ means ... what stands opposite the
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mere observer who simply looks at it, what is present,
after being thematically selected and had as such’’ (pp.
10–17).
Our everyday experience of things ... is neither objectifying
nor a placing over against. When, for example, we sit in
the garden and take delight in a blossoming rose, we do not
make an object of the rose, nor do we even make it some-
thing standing over against us in the sense of something
represented thematically. (Heidegger, 1998, pp. 58–73)
We appreciate the unthematic rose, but it is not a
thematic object unless we abstract from it and approach
it in terms of its ‘‘objective’’ properties, such as redness
or being of a particular cultivar.
For Heidegger, the theme is that which is articulated in
the theoretical comportment, especially through language.
The unthematic is the field of affordances, and more
broadly all action-oriented aspects of equipment, serving as
a background to smooth coping, which Dasein ‘‘under-
stands’’ and ‘‘interprets.’’‘‘[B]eing-in-the-world signifies the
unthematic, circumspect absorption in the references consti-
tutive for the handiness of the totality of equipment’’ (trans-
lation modified; 2010, pp. 75, 76).
More recent phenomenological studies in expert per-
formance further contend that the body itself is often
apprehended in prereflective consciousness during
skilled action (Toner et al., 2016). Prereflective aware-
ness is not merely about external affordances but also
about one’s own kinesthetic states. Although our body
may not always be the theme of consciousness, it is
often in the unthematic horizon. For example, while
walking, I often have a background awareness of my
movements. Although I may not focus on my legs, it is
not as if I were merely floating. And according to
Høffding (2019), ‘‘Flow does not entail any loss neither
of consciousness, nor of self, but rather a momentary
break from or oblivion of that peculiar content in
which the narrative self consists’’ (p. 137). In other
words, although the performer in the flow may feel a
loss of (narrative) self, this does not mean they lose
consciousness.
Smooth coping is largely unconscious, but some of
it may be prereflectively conscious. Note that this claim
is more nuanced than the typical dual-process state-
ment that Type 1 processes are nonconscious. We are
not somehow blacked out when we engage in Type 1
processes. In coping, we may become prereflectively
aware of the results of the sensorimotor processes
involved, or have a sense of agency when accomplish-
ing them. At the same time, the micromotor move-
ments themselves remain outside conscious, intentional
control. As Gallagher (2018) notes, the hand close-to-
automatically opens in the right way for grasping a
cup. I may not make my hand thematic, but I may be
peripherally aware of it.
3.5. Contextualized and associative
In contrast with the seriality, rules, procedures, and
syntax of Type 2 processes, Type 1 processes function
as a neural net, with weighted connections between
nodes and activation that spreads across them.
Typically, this is indicated by calling Type 1 processes
‘‘associative.’’ (While the same processes ultimately
underlie Type 2 processes, they produce functionally
emergent serial processes at the behavioral level
[Carruthers, 2006; Dennett, 1991; Frankish, 2004] by
virtue of the von Neumann bottleneck of working
memory.) Many stereotypes, prototypes, and other
cognitive tricks and shortcuts geared toward satisficing
are based on such parallel networks. In the domain of
embodied action, the relevant cognitive trick or short-
cut is sensorimotor attunement. For example, in grab-
bing a cup, there is a stereotyped pattern of activation
of the parallel central nervous, peripheral nervous, and
muscular networks. The hand develops a sensorimotor
attunement to the cup through a history of coupling
with it. The hand does not follow rules or procedures.
Instead, it operates through a spreading activation of
networks in the motor cortices, cerebellum, motor
ganglia, and muscles, networks that dynamically couple
and adapt to some of the physical properties of the
cup, its distance, the angle presented, and its size, gen-
erating its affordances.
Developing an embodied habit or skill in smooth
coping requires plastic changes in the brain. Motor
skills, for example, develop in the brain in two phases.
First, a short-term, limited learning of specific move-
ments is mediated by increased activation of a limited
cortical network. Second, a long-term, consolidative
learning of comprehensive sensorimotor patterns is
mediated by a bilateral network involving both cortical
and subcortical regions (Floyer-Lea & Matthews, 2005;
Ungerleider, 2002). Some embodied practices, such as
sustained exercise, trigger neuroplastic changes with
cascading consequences beyond skill performance itself,
positively affecting long-term memory, processing
speed, and cognitive health (Kramer et al., 2006).
Embodied skills can also trigger other changes to brain
physiology, such as by triggering angiogenesis or the
production of new blood vessels (Isaacs et al., 1992).
Sensorimotor attunement in smooth coping is not
limited to neuroplastic and other physiological changes
to the brain, however. More expansively, sensorimotor
attunement involves an ‘‘ongoing dynamical adjustment
in which the brain, as part of and along with the larger
organism, settles into the right kind of attunement with
the environment—an environment that is physical but
also social and cultural’’ (Gallagher, 2017, p. 17).
Neuroplastic changes in the brain are complemented by
changes in bodily physiology in the learning of embo-
died skills. For example, beginning weightlifters experi-
ence an initial rapid gain in strength, which later slows
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down. This phenomenon is not simply an effect of
strengthening muscles. It involves changes to how mus-
cles contract under impulses from peripheral motor
neurons, which increase their signaling strength and
efficiency (Aagaard et al., 2002). Different forms and
techniques of weightlifting (e.g. Olympic vs. traditional)
result in the development of distinct patterns of activa-
tions of muscle groups across limbs and the body
(Arabatzi & Kellis, 2012), such that a weightlifter from
one style will activate different muscle networks from a
weightlifter in the other style. As the central nervous
system attunes to particular patterns of peripheral ner-
vous system activation in repetitive weightlifting tasks,
peripheral ganglia, motor plates, and muscles also
undergo changes in their activations and strengths.
Weightlifting is as much a bodily attunement as it is a
cerebral attunement to stereotyped patterns of activa-
tion in parallel networks. The consequence of this dis-
tributed activation and reshaping of neural and bodily
pathways is that multiple embodied networks are
engaged simultaneously at the behavioral level, as well.
In weightlifting, a host of different muscles and limbs
move in tandem to perform a lift and maintain balance.
As with all stereotypes, prototypes, and other asso-
ciative tricks, sensorimotor attunement is always to
very specific contexts, which in the weightlifting exam-
ple are environmental and social. It also does not easily
transfer to similar situations, as we would expect pro-
positional knowledge to. This context-dependence is
characteristic not only of the skill and habit memory
systems that underlie sensorimotor attunement (Ennen,
2003) but also of the peripheral and bodily systems that
also mediate it. When the Olympic weightlifter activates
different muscles from the traditional weightlifter, this
relates not only to their different movements and goals
but also to their different equipment and social milieus.
For example, Olympic squats basically involve a squat
rack and a barbell with weights, with a few other imple-
ments. However, powerlifting squats, which involve
much heavier weights (up to 500 kg or more), can addi-
tionally involve specialized clothing, joint wraps, catch-
ing belts, and a retinue of spotters doubling as
motivators, not to mention ‘‘gear’’ (steroids). Not only
do the Olympic weightlifter’s and the powerlifter’s tech-
niques differ, but their environments yield different
affordances. But change the powerlifter’s environment,
remove all that extra equipment (in ‘‘unequipped lifts’’),
and they will not be able to give the same performance
due to the environmental specificity of sensorimotor
attunement.
According to Varela (1999),
We always operate in some kind of immediacy of a given
situation. Our lived world is so ready-[to]-hand [i.e., zuhan-
den] that we have no deliberateness about what it is and
how we inhabit it. When we sit at the table to eat with a
relative or friend, the entire complex know-how of how to
handle our utensils, how to sit, how to converse, is present
without deliberation ... We have a readiness-for-action
proper to every specific lived situation ... I call any such
readiness-for-action a microidentity and its corresponding
lived situation a microworld. (pp. 9–10)
Sensorimotor attunement is essentially the genera-
tion of a microidentity within a microworld. We are
composed of many microidentities, and we dwell across
many such microworlds. By returning to Varela’s
Heideggerian inspiration, we can further specify that a
microworld has a networked structure. According to
Heidegger, equipment or Zeug has an inherently refer-
ential structure. ‘‘There always belongs to the being of
a useful thing [Zeug] a totality of useful things in which
this useful thing can be what it is. A useful thing is
essentially ‘something in order to ...’’’ (Heidegger,
1928/2010, p. 68). In smooth coping, equipment is
encountered as sets of affordances that are intercon-
nected in a web of contextual relations, or an ‘‘involve-
ment network’’ (Kiverstein, 2012, p. 4). For example,
the gym is for the weightlifter a microworld, one replete
with affordances for lifting, pulling, heaving, and
squatting. The bench press affords lying down. The
action of lying down, in turn, is for the sake of pushing
the barbell away from the chest. Lying down and push-
ing the barbell upward are mutually referential affor-
dances. Lying down without pushing the barbell is
socially inappropriate, as the gym is not a place to relax
or sleep. And pushing the barbell upward from the
chest requires a supine position. Even the gym’s water
fountain is contextually related to the more physically
taxing affordances around, as it helps sustain those
strenuous actions by keeping the weightlifter hydrated.
The gym as a whole forms an involvement network or
what we are calling a microworld.
The weightlifter develops a microidentity, or a sen-
sorimotor attunement, to the gym microworld through
sustained practice over time, going beyond short-term
motor learning to the long-term motor learning involv-
ing cortical and subcortical networks. Furthermore, the
weightlifter’s body transforms as peripheral ganglia,
motor plates, and muscle networks adapt and attune to
the embodied practices in this microworld, most visibly
causing muscular hypertrophy. The weightlifter’s embo-
died patterns of action in this microworld manifest an
embodied rationality as they realize their goals through
bodily performance.
Different microworlds require different sensorimotor
attunements. As such, embodied Type 1 processes are a
meshwork of piecemeal sensorimotor attunements that
have arisen across the many microworlds the agent
dwells and interacts within. Beyond the gym, the weigh-
tlifter may have different sensorimotor attunements to
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the car, home, university, work, bar, and so forth. Each
of these microworlds has different involvement net-
works and hence different context dependencies.
Overall, embodied Type 1 processes have a set of fea-
tures that are all consequences of weighted, spreading
activation of neural nets: stereotypes, prototypes, and
sensorimotor attunements. It just happens that sensori-
motor attunements also involve extra-cerebral network
connections to the peripheral nervous system, muscles,
and microworld, whereas the other forms are compara-
tively more brain-bound.
According to Heidegger, smooth coping is disrupted
through a shift from handiness (Zuhandenheit), to
unhandiness (Unzuhandenheit), to objective presence
(Vorhandenheit). The referential structure of equipment
breaks down when one piece of equipment malfunc-
tions and becomes conspicuous and unhandy.
‘‘Something is unusable. This means that the constitu-
tive reference of the in-order-to to a what-for has been
disrupted’’ (Heidegger, 1928/2010, p. 74). The conspic-
uous, unusable thing already breaks the microworld’s
referential structure, creating a gaping hole in the invol-
vement network. A further reflective step back will fur-
ther break the referential structure and bring forth an
‘‘object.’’ The world of objective presence is a world
replete with objects rather than affordances.
Essentially, this is simply a shift in attitude or disposi-
tion; the environment itself has not somehow changed.
A stark example is a weightlifter appraising a new gym,
seeing its equipment in terms of their brands rather
than in terms of their affordances.
But reflective thought and coping do not function
by a binary switch, as if only one could be active at a
given time. ‘‘Skill is not a matter of bypassing explicit
thought, to let habitual actions run entirely on their
own, but of building and accessing flexible links
between knowing and doing’’ (Sutton et al., 2011, p.
95). For example, a weightlifter may engage in a
higher-order monitoring of and reasoning about their
technique or form as they perform a squat. As they
move with the barbell, they will look in the mirror to
judge and correct their form according to the weigh-
tlifting community’s normative standards. The weigh-
tlifter’s kinesthetic and skillful movements are
unthematic, meaning that they are achieved largely
unconsciously (through the body schema) but that their
results are available for prereflective awareness (e.g. the
weightlifter feels their body moving under strain). They
are simultaneously engaged in a higher-order monitor-
ing of and reasoning about their body through their
body image in the mirror. This monitoring of the mir-
ror body image is thematic, meaning it occupies the
center of conscious attention, contrary to the peripheral
awareness of the body schema. As thematic, the weigh-
tlifter can subject their mirror body image to judg-
ments, judging their form in a way that abstracts from
their immediate coping and microworld and involving
working memory resources, either visuospatial or pho-
nological. In other words, they will use mental imagery
or propositional rules to judge and correct their form.
As the theme of judgment, their body image is taken as
a token of a type of squat, and they can apply mental
simulations as well as propositional rules to decide
whether their token form matches the ideal type. As
they step back from their immediate situation by enga-
ging in normative judgment, the weightlifter is attitud-
inally disposed to their body image as an objectively
present (vorhanden) object. The reflective judgment is a
form of disattunement from their microworld, as it
involves propositions, symbols, and mental simulations
of forms that are abstracted from this singular micro-
world. Yet, all the while they continue in their embo-
died coping as they perform the squat. Type 1
sensorimotor attunement continues while the reflective,
Table 2. General Type 1 features and correlates, and remarks on how they manifest in smooth coping.
Type 1 feature or correlate Special remarks for smooth coping
features
working memory No primary use of working memory.




‘‘Biased responses’’ assumes a symbolic or linguistic modality. Instrumental rationality may be a
more general correlate. In smooth coping, this is equivalent to embodied rationality.
parallel The parallel networks also involve the peripheral nervous system, muscles, and even extended
aspects of the microworld.
high capacity Can perform multiple independent tasks.
fast Allowing it to outperform deliberative action.
nonconscious But also, in part, prereflectively conscious.
contextualized and associative In smooth coping, associative networks develop through sensorimotor attunement
to microworlds.
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Type 2 processes simultaneously disattune from the
immediate environment to impose procedural and rule-
based standards on it.
4. Conclusion
Although dual-process theory was originally devised to
explain biases in judgment (Wason & Evans, 1974), it
has since expanded into multiple domains, and embo-
died cognition is one of them (S. E. Dreyfus, 2014;
Furley et al., 2015; Körner & Strack, 2018; Petracca,
2020). The everyday, embodied action that pervades
our lives is replete with Type 1 processes:
1. Smooth coping involves the defining features of
Type 1 processes (autonomy and no necessary reli-
ance on working memory) as well as of their typical
correlates (instrumental rationality, high capacity
and activation through parallel networks, rapid
speed, nonconscious processing, and contextualized,
associative mechanisms (see Table 2). (I have
defended replacing biased responses with instrumen-
tal rationality.)
2. Therefore, smooth coping is composed primarily of
Type 1 processes, although Type 2 processes can also
play a role, such as in expert action.
There is no need to posit a new ‘‘Type 0’’ or ‘‘System
0’’ for smooth coping, as Stuart Dreyfus (2014) does.
Smooth coping bears the same features and correlates
of Type 1 processes, albeit with some special aspects
whose uniqueness is related to their motor modality.
For example, the associative networks that develop in
smooth coping involve not only the brain but also the
peripheral nervous system, musculature, and possibly
even extended aspects of the environment, whereas for
more conceptual Type 1 processes (such as an associa-
tion between wearing a medical coat and trustworthi-
ness) the primary locus is the brain.
Compared with Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth
coping, the embodied dual-process theory that I argue
for yields distinctly different hypotheses. Dreyfus
understands coping as a process that competes with
executive control and predicts that it will be interrupted
by executive control and propositional thought—not
only in expert action (as with choking) but also in
everyday tasks like walking. According to our embo-
died dual-process model; however, smooth coping and
executive, higher-order reasoning are separate pro-
cesses that do not directly compete for the same cogni-
tive resources. Type 1 processes do not compete for
working memory resources that are integral to Type 2
processes. Hence, the embodied dual-process model
makes comprehensible phenomena like driving while
talking, or walking while contemplating, something
which would be unexplained in Dreyfus’ model.
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Notes
1. Although this is the dominant dual-process interpretation
of Type 1, see Mandelbaum (2016) for a critique of asso-
ciation in dual-process theory (in the context of implicit
bias).
2. However, some forms of Vorhandenheit can be more basic
and intuitive, for example, a Lockean perception of com-
plex ideas (which is a kind of theoretical rather than
action-oriented perception).
3. There is a significant controversy over whether Heidegger
provides an embodied account (Aho, 2010). Heidegger
never explicitly thematizes the body, yet his pragmatic
account of action seems to require that Dasein be embo-
died. For the purposes of this article, I take the view that
Heidegger’s account of Dasein inherently assumes
embodiment.
4. Type 1 processes are parallel because many of them can
operate simultaneously. But Type 2 processes are serial
because only one of them can operate at a time, due to the
constraints of working memory, a resource they all share.
It is true that they can operate ‘‘in parallel with’’ Type 1
processes, as the latter are independent of working mem-
ory, but the relevant sense of serial/parallel here is within
the type itself.
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